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# Big Data and Financial Markets

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- 1 Context and Stakes
- 2 Learning by Trading: Optimal Routing of Orders
- 3 Decision Support For Thousands of Trading Algorithms
- 4 Perspectives

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Easy access to larger digitalized datasets, storage capacities, processing capabilities is changing a lot of industries. **The financial industry is largely impacted.**

One of the features of the innovations brought by these technological improvements is **disintermediation**. Examples: TV vs. youtube, taxis vs. Uber, stores vs. Amazon, newspapers vs. google news and blogs, etc.

**The financial system is essentially an intermediary**, A financial system provides [Merton, 1995]

- ▶ a payments system for the exchange of goods and services;
- ▶ a mechanism for the pooling of funds to undertake large-scale indivisible enterprise;
- ▶ a way to transfer economic resources through time and across geographic regions and industries;
- ▶ a way to manage uncertainty and control risk;
- ▶ price information that helps coordinate decentralized decision-making in various sectors of the economy;
- ▶ provides a way to deal with the asymmetric-information and incentive problems when one party to a financial transaction has information that the other party does not.

Because the financial system is no more than a large intermediary, we will focus on some examples in this talk, but keep in mind **it is a game changing transformation** . To insist, just list some examples:

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→ “Last look” trading mechanisms, automated market making [Fermanian et al., 2015], electronic brokers [Almgren, 2012] [Brandes et al., 2007], etc.

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I will give few examples of how math finance can play a role in this revolution. They are short chapters of a far largest story:

- ▶ **Fragmentation** is at the root of disintermediation (think about `booking.com`).  
There is no more one financial market place but a collection of electronic trading venues (compared to OTC trades).  
I will show how to optimally fragment and route an order to obtain the needed liquidity at the best price?  
[Pagès et al., 2011]
- ▶ **Human-Machine Interface** will be more needed than ever.  
Humans will need decision support tools in an automated environment, and machines will have to take profit of humans' understanding of the context.  
I will present a decision-support system to allow few traders to monitor thousands of trading algorithms.  
[Azencott et al., 2014]

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
# Fragmentation is at The Root of Disintermediation



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


On Berkeley's Campus: This is competition (and fragmentation)



The Fragmentation of Microsoft the last 20 days (Source: Fidessa's fragulator)





The Fragmentation of Microsoft the last 20 days (Source: Fidessa's fragulator) [more...](#)

When a human or robot trader wants to buy or sell few shares, he has to split his order and send it to available venues in the hope to obtain the desired size.

- ▶ on the one hand you have to split according to information you have
- ▶ be sure to be kept updated when information changes...

It is a typical **Exploration-Exploitation problem** [Lamberton and Pagès, 2008], especially in Dark Pools. We (joint work with S. Laruelle and G. Pagès [Pagès et al., 2011]) solved it using a **stochastic algorithm**.

Documented approaches:

- ▶ [Ganchev et al., 2010] estimates the liquidity in each pool and implements a deterministic optimization;
- ▶ [Agarwal et al., 2010] uses a minimum regret approach;
- ▶ We implement the stochastic version of an optimal trading scheme.

The first approach is good for opportunistic trading (hedge fund), the second for a rare and not really flexible flow (investor), the last one is good for very large systematic flow (broker).

Minimizing the expected execution cost, *given the price S*, amounts to:

Maximization problem to solve

$$\max \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^N \rho_i \mathbb{E} (S (r_i V \wedge D_i)), r \in \mathcal{P}_N \right\}$$

where  $\mathcal{P}_N := \left\{ r = (r_i)_{1 \leq i \leq N} \in \mathbb{R}_+^N \mid \sum_{i=1}^N r_i = 1 \right\}$ .

It is then convenient to **include the price S into both random variables V and D<sub>i</sub>** by considering  $\tilde{V} := VS$  and  $\tilde{D}_i := D_i S$  instead of V and D<sub>i</sub>. Assume that the distribution function of D/V is continuous on  $\mathbb{R}_+$ . Let  $\varphi(r) = \rho \mathbb{E} (\min (rV, D))$  be the mean execution function of a single dark pool ( $\Phi = \sum_i \varphi_i(r_i)$ ), and assume that  $V > 0 \mathbb{P} - a.s.$  and  $\mathbb{P}(D > 0) > 0$

Let's take 2 slides to understand a generic method to be applied to **any online trading algorithm**.

Few preliminary remarks:

- ▶ The stationary solutions of the ODE:  $\dot{x} = h(x)$  contains the extremal values of  $F(x) = \int_0^x h(x) dx$
- ▶ A discretized version of the ODE is ( $\gamma$  is a step):

$$(1) \quad x_{n+1} = x_n + \gamma_{n+1} h(x_n)$$

- ▶ A stochastic version of this being ( $\xi_n$  are i.i.d. realizations of a random variable,  $h(X) = \mathbb{E}(H(X, \xi_1))$ ,  $F(x) = \int_0^x \mathbb{E}H(X, \xi_1) dx$ ):

$$(2) \quad X_{n+1} = X_n + \gamma_{n+1} H(X_n, \xi_{n+1})$$

- ▶ the stochastic algorithms theory is a set of results describing the relationship between these 3 formula and the nature of  $\gamma$ ,  $H$ ,  $h$  and  $\xi$  [Hirsch and Smith, 2005], [Kushner and Yin, 2003], [Doukhan, 1994]

Now we can do the reverse. This theory can be used when you only have a sequential access to a functional you need to minimize. It is clearly the case in trading.

- ▶ To minimize a criteria  $\mathbb{E}(F(X, \xi_1))$  of a state variable  $X$
- ▶ if it is possible to compute:

$$H(X_n, \xi_{n+1}) := \frac{\partial F}{\partial X}(X_n, \xi_{n+1})$$

- ▶ now you can implement the following sequential algorithm (no more expectation in it):

$$X_{n+1} = X_n + \gamma_{n+1} H(X_n, \xi_{n+1})$$

- ▶ the results of the stochastic algorithms theory (like the Robbins-Monro theorem [Robbins and Monro, 1951], [Pagès et al., 1990]) gives conditions under which it converges (especially on the time steps  $\gamma$ ).
- ▶ Moreover they give you central limit theorem like results, i.e. **you can control the variance** (i.e. the speed at which it converges).

We aim at solving the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{r \in \mathcal{P}_N} \Phi(r), \quad \Phi(r) := \sum_{i=1}^N \rho_i \mathbb{E}(S(r_i V \wedge D_i)).$$

The Lagrangian associated to the sole affine constraint is

$$L(r, \lambda) = \Phi(r) - \lambda \left( \sum_{i=1}^N r_i - 1 \right)$$

So,

$$\forall i \in \mathcal{I}_N, \quad \frac{\partial L}{\partial r_i} = \varphi'_i(r_i) - \lambda.$$

This suggests that any  $r^* \in \arg \max_{\mathcal{P}_N} \Phi$  iff  $\varphi'_i(r_i^*)$  is constant when  $i$  runs over  $\mathcal{I}_N$  or equivalently if

$$\forall i \in \mathcal{I}_N, \quad \varphi'_i(r_i^*) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \varphi'_j(r_j^*).$$

To ensure that the candidate provided by the Lagrangian approach is the true one, we need an additional assumption on  $\varphi$  to take into account the behaviour of  $\Phi$  on the boundary of  $\partial\mathcal{P}_N$ .

## Proposition 1

Assume that  $(V, D_i)$  satisfies upper assumptions for every  $i \in \mathcal{I}_N$ . Assume that the functions  $\varphi_i$  satisfy the following assumption

$$(3) \quad (C) \equiv \min_{i \in \mathcal{I}_N} \varphi_i'(0) > \max_{i \in \mathcal{I}_N} \varphi_i' \left( \frac{1}{N-1} \right).$$

Then  $\arg \max_{\mathcal{H}_N} \Phi = \arg \max_{\mathcal{P}_N} \Phi \subset \text{int}(\mathcal{P}_N)$  where

$$\arg \max_{\mathcal{P}_N} \Phi = \{r \in \mathcal{P}_N \mid \varphi_i'(r_i) = \varphi_1'(r_1), i = 1, \dots, N\}.$$

## Characterization of the solution

$$r^* \in \arg \max_{\mathcal{P}_N} \Phi \Leftrightarrow \forall i \in \{1, \dots, N\}, \mathbb{E} \left( V \left( \rho_i \mathbf{1}_{\{r_i^* V < D_i\}} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \rho_j \mathbf{1}_{\{r_j^* V < D_j\}} \right) \right) = 0.$$

Consequently, this leads to the following recursive zero search procedure

$$(4) \quad r_i^{n+1} = r_i^n + \gamma_{n+1} H_i(r^n, Y^{n+1}), \quad r^0 \in \mathcal{P}_N, \quad i \in \mathcal{I}_N,$$

where for  $i \in \mathcal{I}_N$ , every  $r \in \mathcal{P}_N$ , every  $V > 0$  and every  $D_1, \dots, D_N \geq 0$ ,

$$H_i(r, Y) = V \left( \rho_i \mathbf{1}_{\{r_i V < D_i\}} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \rho_j \mathbf{1}_{\{r_j V < D_j\}} \right)$$

with  $(Y^n)_{n \geq 1}$  a sequence of random vectors with non negative components such that, for every  $n \geq 1$ ,  $(V^n, D_j^n, j = 1, \dots, N) \stackrel{d}{=} (V, D_j, j = 1, \dots, N)$ .



## The underlying idea of the algorithm

is to reward the dark pools which outperform the mean of the  $N$  dark pools by increasing the allocated volume sent at the next step (and conversely).

## Theorem 1: Convergence

Assume that  $(V, D)$  satisfy upper assumptions, that  $V \in L^2(\mathbb{P})$  and that Assumption (C) holds. Let  $\gamma := (\gamma_n)_{n \geq 1}$  be a step sequence satisfying the usual decreasing step assumption

$$\sum_{n \geq 1} \gamma_n = +\infty \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{n \geq 1} \gamma_n^2 < +\infty.$$

Let  $(V^n, D_1^n, \dots, D_N^n)_{n \geq 1}$  be an i.i.d. sequence defined on a probability space  $(\Omega, \mathcal{A}, \mathbb{P})$ . Then, there exists an  $\text{argmax}_{\mathcal{P}_N} \Phi$ -valued random variable  $r^*$  such that

$$r^n \longrightarrow r^* \quad \text{a.s.}$$

To establish a *CLT*, we need to ensure the existence of the Hessian of the objective function  $\Phi$ . This needs further assumption on a couple  $(V, D)$  which is that its distribution function given  $\{D > 0\}$  is absolutely continuous with a density  $f$  defined on  $(0, +\infty)^2$ . Furthermore, for every  $v > 0, u \mapsto f(v, u)$  is cont. and pos. on  $\mathbb{R}_+$ , and  $\forall \varepsilon \in (0, 1), \sup_{\varepsilon v \leq u \leq v/\varepsilon} f_D(V, u) V^2 \in L^1(\mathbb{P})$ . The conditional distribution function of  $D$  given  $\{D > 0\}$  and  $V$  is given by for  $u \geq 0, v > 0$ ,

$$F_D(u | V = v, \mathbf{1}_{\{D > 0\}}) := \mathbb{P}(D \leq u | V = v, \mathbf{1}_{\{D > 0\}}) = \int_0^u f(v, u') du'$$





## Theorem 2: Central Limit Theorem

Assume that  $\operatorname{argmax} \Phi = \{r^*\}$ ,  $r^* \in \mathcal{P}_N$  so that  $r^n \xrightarrow{n \rightarrow \infty} r^*$   $\mathbb{P}$ -a.s. and that Assumption (??) holds for every  $(V, D_i), i \in \mathcal{I}_N$  and  $V \in L^{2+\delta}(\mathbb{P}), \delta > 0$ . Set  $\gamma_n = \frac{c}{n}, n \geq 1$  with  $c > 1/2 \Re(\lambda_{\min})$  where  $\lambda_{\min}$  denotes the eigenvalue of  $A^\infty := -Dh(r^*)|_{\mathbf{1}^\perp}$  with the lowest real part. Then  $\sqrt{\gamma_n}^{-1} (r^n - r^*) \xrightarrow{\mathcal{L}} \mathcal{N}(0; \Sigma^\infty)$ , where the

asymptotic covariance matrix  $\Sigma^\infty$  is given by  $\Sigma^\infty = \int_0^\infty e^{u(A^\infty - \frac{ld}{2c})} C^\infty e^{u(A^\infty - \frac{ld}{2c})^t} du$  where

$C^\infty = \mathbb{E} (H(r^*, V, D_1, \dots, D_N) H(r^*, V, D_1, \dots, D_N)^t)|_{\mathbf{1}^\perp}$  and  $(A^\infty - \frac{ld}{2c})^t$  stands for the *transpose operator* of  $A^\infty - \frac{ld}{2c} \in \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{1}^\perp)$ .

Some “backtests” using reconstructed data: we implemented an “Oracle” (it knows the future) and a simpler “reinforcement” policy (at left). We tested different market impact functions  $\kappa = 0$  means no impact (at right).



Maintaining the learning during 10 day

Reinitialization each morning

Of course it is possible to do better, for instance by implementing a “smart reset”, etc.

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Each trader monitors 150 to 700 trading algorithms. Algorithms react:


- ▶ to realtime feeds,
- ▶ estimates,
- ▶ market state.

Algo have “meta parameters” that can be tuned by traders.


In real-time, we (joint work with R. Azencott, A. Beri, Y. Gadhyan, N. Joseph and M. Rowley [Azencott et al., 2014]) will

- ▶ attempt to predict on the fly the quality of trading of the thousands of algos using potential explanatory variables (i.e. “features”),
- ▶ that for we will need to extract features on price formation at high frequency,
- ▶ if a feature explains successfully bad performance, we will
  1. announce the feature is potentially at the root of the anomaly,
  2. group algorithms using this feature to help traders to take decisions.

- ▶ We define some **efficiency criteria**  $Y_t$  (like performance) and some **potential explanatory variables**  $X_t^1, \dots, X_t^N$  (like a sector, an increase of volatility, a change in liquidity).
- ▶ On the fly (for instance every five minutes), we will **build predictors**  $\phi(X) = \mathbb{E}(Y|X)$  of the current performance of all the trading algorithms of a trader using the sector, the volatility level, the liquidity, etc.
- ▶ The variables succeeding to explain bad performances will be said to be the **causes of bad performance**. That for, we will define the *predicting power*  $\pi(t)$  of each variable  $X^i$ .




- ▶ We use the PnL (in bid ask spread) as a performance criterion;
- ▶ We use market descriptors: volatility (risk), bid-ask spread (liquidity), and momentum (directionality);
- ▶ We renormalize them using their *scores* (i.e. their empirical likelihood);
- ▶ We add patterns: price trends, price jumps and volume peaks.




Scoring increases the “contrast” of the figure.





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- ▶ To be fast and take into account the number of possible predictors given the number of data,
- ▶ at each  $t$ , we select the 5% worst performances (i.e.  $Y$  is now zero or one) and try to explain them
- ▶ using two-sided binary predictors:

$$\phi(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x \in [\theta^-, \theta^+] \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- ▶ we choose the thresholds  $(\theta^-(i), \theta^+(i))$  to obtain the best possible predictor for each  $X^i$ .

## Generic Optimal Randomized Predictors

Fix a random vector  $\mathbb{X} \in R^N$  of explanatory factors and a target binary variable  $Y$ . Let  $0 \leq v(x) \leq 1$  be any Borel function of  $x \in R^N$  such that  $v(\mathbb{X}) = P(Y = 1 | X)$  almost surely.

For any Borel decision function  $\phi \in \Phi$ , define the predictive power of the randomized predictor  $\hat{Y}_\phi$  by  $\pi(\phi) = Q(\mu, P^1(\phi), P^0(\phi))$ , where  $Q$  is a fixed continuous and increasing function of the probabilities of correct decisions  $P^1, P^0$ . Then there exists  $\psi \in \Phi$  such that the predictor  $\hat{Y}_\psi$  has maximum predictive power

$$\pi(\psi) = \max_{\phi \in \Phi} \pi(\phi)$$

Any such optimal Borel function  $0 \leq \psi(x) \leq 1$  must almost surely verify, for some suitably selected constant  $0 \leq c \leq 1$ .

$$(5) \quad \psi(X) = 1 \text{ for } v(X) > c; \quad \psi(X) = 0 \text{ for } v(X) < c.$$

Meaning that our two-sided predictors are not bad at all when it comes to do something simple. Moreover we have confidence intervals too (see in the paper).

## Influence of explanatory variables

We define the influence of  $\mathfrak{X}$  a subset of explanatory variables as the **predictive power** of the best predictor:

$$\mathcal{I}_t(\mathfrak{X}, Y) = \pi(\psi) = \max_{\phi \in \Phi} \pi(\phi).$$



Remind we do not use the past of the variables  $X$  (except to build their *score* and for the *pattern matching* detectors).

We just rely here on the **joint distribution** of  $(Y, X)$  over all the instrument currently traded. It means we will use the states of all algorithms to try to establish a relation, now, between bad performances and variables of interest.

At the end of this process:


- ▶ at each update,
- ▶ we build optimal predictors and combinations of predictors explaining at most current bad performances.
- ▶ Implicitly we selected **hyperplanes in the space of combinations of our explanatory variables** separating trading algos with good perf. vs. bad ones.
- ▶ Some subsets of predictors are good (i.e. they allow hyperplanes to be efficiently positioned), others are not.
- ▶ This allows us to **identify variables currently influencing the performances**. They are said to be the **causes of bad performances**.
- ▶ We present to the trader the summarized information: “*sort by this variable if you want to understand what is happening to your algos*”.

## Seen from one trading algo



- ▶ top: the explanatory variable.
- ▶ bottom: the performance.
- ▶ The performance quantile is in dotted red; around update 40 this algo is 3 times among the 5% worst performers;
- ▶ on update 41, the spread score is selected by the good predictors to be used:  $\theta^- = 0$ ,  $\theta^+ \simeq 70\%$ .



## Seen from one trading algo



- ▶ top: the explanatory variable.
- ▶ bottom: the performance.
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- ▶ around update 32, the volume score is selected to predict bad perf. of other algos.





## Seen from one trading algo



- ▶ top: the explanatory variable.
- ▶ bottom: the performance.
- ▶ The performance quantile is in dotted red; around update 40 this algo is 3 times among the 5% worst performers;
- ▶ the volatility score is selected at update 42, but the associated predictors says it is ok for this algo.

## Seen from one trading algo



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- ▶ bottom: the performance.
- ▶ The performance quantile is in dotted red; around update 40 this algo is 3 times among the 5% worst performers;

- ▶ the volatility score is selected at update 42, but the associated predictors says it is ok for this algo.

Now you can tell traders the volatility is a potential source of bad performance of algos at time  $t = 42$  (i.e. 12h30, Paris time) and point out the algorithms affected by this anomaly.

- 1 Context and Stakes
- 2 Learning by Trading: Optimal Routing of Orders
- 3 Decision Support For Thousands of Trading Algorithms
- 4 Perspectives**

We have seen two examples of the use of machine learning methods on financial markets to answer the needs created by **disintermediation** :

- ▶ **Fragmentation** demands exploration-exploitation solutions [Pagès et al., 2011],
- ▶ **Automation** demands decision support tools building on the fly a human-driven understanding of what is going on [Azencott et al., 2014].

But the main message of this talk is an invitation to discuss the business changes in the financial industry. From a quantitative perspective, it should go through

- ▶ using **new data**,
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**Thank you for your attention!**

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